Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules by Liscow, Zachary D.
 COUNTER-CYCLICAL BANKRUPTCY LAW: AN EFFICIENCY
 ARGUMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT-PRESERVING BANKRUPTCY RULES
 Zachary Liscow*
 Bankruptcy judges consider both value to creditors and harm to
 employees in deciding whether to liquidate or reorganize firms. This
 Article proposes to systematize what is currently an ad hoc trade-off by
 making bankruptcy law explicitly counter-cyclical - that is, placing
 more weight on preserving employment during times of high unemploy-
 ment. Although the suggestion that bankruptcy law should consider em-
 ployment effects runs counter to decades of economic analysis of
 bankruptcy law, this Article bases its analysis on the traditional law
 and economics efficiency norm. Duńng times of high unemployment,
 significant social benefits flow from maintaining employment, as evi-
 denced by the hundreds of billions of dollars that the government has
 recently spent to maintain employment. The simple argument of this
 Article is that when bankruptcy law can preserve employment more
 cheaply than government spending can, it should do so.
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 B. "Community Concerns": "Proceduralists" Versus "Traditionalists" in
 Bankruptcy Law
 II. Model of Bankruptcy and Employment
 A. Background Macroeconomic Literature
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 D. Accounting for Context Dependence
 III. Implementing Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law
 A. Implementation Using § 1112(b) Under Current Statute
 B. Other Means of Implementing Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law
 Under Current Statute
 C. Statutory Changes to Implement Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy
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 IV. Example Application
 * Associate Professor, Yale Law School. Thanks to Al Klevorick and Alan Schwartz
 for their long lists of insights. I also wish to thank Anne Alstott, Ken Ayotte, Ian Ayres,
 Douglas Baird, Nick Bloom, Ed Fox, Judge Andrew Hurwitz, David Liscow, Yair Listokin,
 Michael Marvin, Jonathan Masur, Andrew Metrick, John Morley, Roberta Romano, Sarath
 Sanga, Damia  Schaible, David Schleicher, Judge Stephen Williams, Willia  Woolston,
 and the editors at the Columbia Law Review for helpful comments and conversations.
 1461
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.150 on Wed, 26 Apr 2017 18:45:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1462 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:1461
 V. Responding to Potential Critiques
 A. The Institutional Competency of the Bankruptcy System
 B. Asymmetry with Law Outside of Bankruptcy
 C. Alternative Policies Would Be Superior
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 Suppose that a bankruptcy judge has two options in a bankruptcy
 proceeding of a factory. First, the judge could reorganize the factory,
 resulting in a $1,000,000 payment to creditors and keeping the factory
 largely intact. Second, the judge could liquidate the factory, resulting in a
 $1,500,000 payment to creditors and the loss of 1,000 jobs as the factory
 is shuttered. What should the bankruptcy judge choose? Conventional
 law and economics analysis dictates shuttering the plant to maximize the
 return to creditors and thereby maximize efficiency. Contrary to the pre-
 vailing view in law and economics, this Article argues that during times of
 high unemployment the judge should instead choose reorganization in
 order to preserve jobs, despite the lower payment to creditors. Doing so
 can reduce the suffering caused by unemployment while also reducing
 costs to taxpayers.
 The argument rests solely on economic efficiency. During and
 around recessions,1 an inefficiently large number of people are unem-
 ployed, and both worker surplus (the gain that workers receive over the
 cost of providing labor) and producer surplus (profits) are lost.
 Keynesian stimulus programs seek to rectify this inefficiency, increasing
 employment in two ways. First, stimulus increases employment directly
 through increased government hiring and spending. Second, Keynesian
 stimulus does so indirectly through the "Keynesian multiplier." The
 Keynesian multiplier refers to the process by which an increase in
 government spending or reduction in taxes increases consumer spend-
 ing among beneficiaries of the spending or tax cuts, in turn increasing
 employment among those who benefit from that increased consumer
 spending; these newly employed people spend more money because
 1. A "recession," as used in this Article, is a time when the economy is operating
 significantly below its potential output, with consequent underutilization of capital and
 elevated unemployment. It does not mean just a contraction in economic output, as
 the term is sometimes technically taken to mean. See US Business Cycle Expansions
 and Contractions, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, http://www.nber.org/cycles/
 US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_20120423.pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/ 65DJ-
 YVYZ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016) ("The NBER does not define a recession in terms of two
 consecutive quarters of decline in read GDR Rather, a recession is a significant decline in
 economic activity spread across the economy ....").
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 their own incomes have gone up, thereby causing the cycle to repeat it-
 self.2 The government spends to mitigate the pain and reduce the effi-
 ciency losses of high unemployment in two ways. First, during times of
 high unemployment, governments typically spend money to increase em-
 ployment.3 Indeed, the government spent over $800 billion with this goal
 in mind in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 alone.4
 Second, since more people are unemployed at these times, government
 spending on social-insurance and income-support programs increases.
 Raising money through taxes to fund Keynesian job-creation efforts and
 increased payments to unemployed workers, however, distorts incentives
 to work and save.5 This Article argues that, instead of incurring these
 inefficiencies to increase employment during recessions, in some cases it
 is more efficient to incur other, but smaller, inefficiencies - in particular,
 reorganizing rather than liquidating some firms that are more valuable
 to creditors and owners liquidated. Yes, doing so would reduce returns to
 creditors and make it less likely that creditors will invest, thereby
 harming businesses. But preserving jobs through bankruptcy law can
 sometimes avoid reducing incentives to work and save - a potentially
 larger inefficiency caused by tax increases to pay for employment-
 increasing government spending.
 If taxes were not distortionary, bankruptcy law ideally would not seek
 to sustain employment, since tax-funded spending could do so without
 causing distortion. But in a "second-best" world, where there is already at
 least one distortion, adding a second distortion does not necessarily in-
 crease, and can in fact decrease, the total amount of distortion.6 This
 Article applies such reasoning, suggesting that bankruptcy law can create
 an additional distortion by considering employment effects but
 nonetheless reduce the distortion overall by reducing the distortion from
 taxation. The Article proposes that bankruptcy law weigh two concerns:
 2. N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics 262-64 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter
 Mankiw, Macroeconomics] .
 3. See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C. (2012)).
 4. James Freeman, Editorial, Obama's Stimulus, Five Years Later, Wall St. J. (Feb. 17,
 2015), www.wsj.com/arficles/SB10001424052702303945704579387692278347858 (on file
 with the Columbia Law Review) . Prior work suggests that it costs $26,000 to create or save a
 job - and this is on the low end of estimates. See Gabriel Chodorow-Reich et al., Does
 State Fiscal Relief During Recessions Increase Employment? Evidence from the American
 Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 4 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 118, 137 (2012). The Obama
 Administration itself estimates that it spent $125,000 per job. Council of Econ. Advisers,
 Exec. Office of the President, The Economic Impact of the American Recovery and
 Reinvestment Act Five Years Later: Final Report to Congress 3, 10 tbl.3 (2014),
 www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_arra_report.pdf
 [http://perma.cc/29JD-BN8M] .
 5. See Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal
 Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 128, 132-33 (1985).
 6. R.G. Lipsey 8c Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev.
 Econ. Stud. 11,12 (1956).
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 (1) the costs to creditors and businesses from preserving jobs through
 bankruptcy and (2) the taxes necessary to fund programs that promote
 employment. On the one hand, if - with the goal of preserving jobs -
 bankruptcy courts do not maximize the return to creditors, creditors will
 lose more money. Furthermore, future creditors, knowing that courts will
 do this, will be less likely to lend to businesses, which will suffer
 correspondingly. One can think of the distortion to lending caused by
 courts' consideration of job preservation as an "employment
 preservation tax"7 on creditors. On the other hand, if bankruptcy courts
 do not seek to preserve jobs during recessions, a government seeking to
 maintain employment will face increased expenditures on social-
 insurance and employment-stimulus programs, which means that the
 government must at some point raise taxes to fund those obligations.
 These taxes reduce work and investment and make the economy worse
 off. The fact that the government must raise funds through distortionary
 taxes means that even "nonideal" policies may be best when they coexist
 with other policies like distortionary taxes.
 This Article first proposes "counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules" that
 calibrate how much bankruptcy judges consider the employment effects
 of a bankruptcy proceeding based on where the economy is in the busi-
 ness cycle. If labor markets are working properly and unemployment
 rates are low, then the bankruptcy judge should not consider employ-
 ment effects and instead focus on maximizing return to creditors. If la-
 bor markets are not working properly and unemployment rates are high
 (so that a job saved at a reorganized firm is likely to lead to a reduced
 unemployment rate), then the bankruptcy judge should return less to
 creditors in some cases, thereby saving jobs and, in turn, saving the gov-
 ernment money. The rules this Article proposes have substantial scope
 for affecting employment and efficiency by way of preserving through
 bankruptcy both fewer jobs during times of low unemployment and more
 jobs during times of high unemployment: From 1980 through 2012,
 there were over 1.7 million business bankruptcy filings,8 and
 approximately 1,000 were large, publicly traded corporations that em-
 ployed over 7.4 million workers before their filings.9
 7. See Professors Thomas Jackson and David Skeel add that promoting economic
 recovery through the appropriate allocation of capital is another benefit of maximizing
 the value to creditors. Thomas H.Jackson 8c David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy and Economic
 Recovery 17-20 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst, for Law 8c Econ., Research Paper No. 13-27,
 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306138 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
 8. The source of the data for this calculation is Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual Business
 and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980-2015), http://www.abi.org/newsroom/
 bankruptcy-statistics (follow "Annual and Non-business Filings by Year (1998-2015)"
 hyperlink) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) .
 9. Those reorganized had at least 2.6 million employees after reorganization.
 UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA Sch. of Law, Cases Table (on file
 with the Columbia Law Review) (database updated Mar. 10, 2016).
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 This Article arrives at a kind of midpoint in the debate over the ex-
 tent to which bankruptcy law should consider "community concerns"
 beyond the interests of the firm's owners and creditors, such as those of
 employees, customers, suppliers, and the local community.10 Legislative
 history suggests that Congress intended for the bankruptcy process to
 support employment.11 "Traditionalist" bankruptcy scholars like Professor
 Elizabeth Warren have argued bankruptcy should consider community
 concerns.12 In recent decades, though, efficiency-minded law and ec-
 onomics scholars have questioned this emphasis. These "proceduralists"
 suggest that bankruptcy should maximize the return to creditors and
 shareholders.13 This Article assumes the normative goal of efficiency but
 finds that pursuing efficiency sometimes supports the argument that
 bankruptcy should consider employment effects. It also provides support
 for positions taken by some academics for why the bankruptcy process
 should consider community concerns.
 10. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 788 (1987)
 (arguing that bankruptcy law should have a variety of goals, including community inter-
 ests); see also Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System 8
 (1997) (arguing for inclusion of community interests in the bankruptcy system); Donald
 R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 717,
 720-21 (1991); cf. Douglas Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
 Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 824-26 (1987) (arguing bankruptcy policy should
 maximize returns to creditors). This Article supports some elements of the argument of
 Professor Elizabeth Warren in this famous debate with Professor Douglas Baird.
 11. When it introduced the current Chapter 11 in 1977, the House Judiciary
 Committee wrote in its report that:
 The purpose of a business reorganization case ... is to restructure a
 business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees
 with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders ....
 It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because
 it preserves jobs and assets.
 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977) (emphasis added). This language has been cited by
 the Supreme Court to mean that "[t]he fundamental purpose of reorganization is to pre-
 vent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible mis-
 use of economic resources." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). The
 Court also said that bankruptcy courts should "balanc [e] the interests of the affected par-
 ties - the debtor, creditors, and employees . . . [including] any qualitative differences be-
 tween the types of hardship each may face." Id. at 527. Citing the same language, the
 Court in United States v. Whiting Pools , Inc. said that, "[b]y permitting reorganization,
 Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors'
 claims, and to produce a return for its owners." 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983).
 12. JefTFerriell 8c Edward J. Janger, Understanding Bankruptcy § 1.02 (2013) ("A key
 difference between the proceduralists and the traditionalists concerns whether bankruptcy
 should be used to advance goals of stakeholders other than creditors."); Warren, supra
 note 10, at 788-93 (arguing that bankruptcy law should seek to promote broader commu-
 nity and distributive interests).
 13. See, e.g., Ferriell & Janger, supra note 12, § 1.02 ("[Bankruptcy should do noth-
 ing more than preserve value for creditors by seeking to eliminate the inefficiencies that
 are inherent in atomistic state collection proceedings."); Baird, supra note 10, at 822-24
 (arguing that bankruptcy policy should seek to maximize returns to creditors).
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 This Article does not take a position on whether bankruptcy law
 should consider employment effects more or less than it already does
 overall but rather proposes what bankruptcy law should target when it
 does so. In particular, this Article offers a method and the relevant data
 for implementing a simple cost-benefit rule that constrains the current ad
 hoc judicial discretion exercised in considering employment effects.
 Many law and economics scholars of bankruptcy law believe there is a
 "pro-reorganization" or "procontinuation bias" in bankruptcy law as it
 stands.14 This Article argues that when unemployment is high, this
 tendency toward reorganization, consistent with apparent congressional
 intent, is appropriate; a job saved in bankruptcy will increase overall
 employment, reduce hardship for workers, and save the government
 money.
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates this Article in the de-
 bate between the "traditionalists" and "proceduralists" in bankruptcy law
 and also, more broadly, in the debate about "efficient" legal rules. Part II
 develops an efficiency-based normative framework for assessing when
 bankruptcy judges should take into account the employment effects of
 bankruptcy. Part III explains how these rules could be implemented in
 practice. Part IV gives an example calculation of how a bankruptcy judge
 could evaluate the benefits of preserving jobs through reorganization.
 Part V responds to potential critiques.
 I. Efficient Bankruptcy Law and Efficient Legal Rules
 A. The Broader Debate About Efficient Legal Rules
 The debate over whether bankruptcy should aim to maximize share-
 holder and creditor returns is part of the broader debate over whether
 legal rules or taxes (or, in this case, tax-funded programs) should be used
 to achieve social goals.15 Taxes distort behavior, reducing incentives to
 14. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of
 Continuation Bias in Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & Econ. 381, 392-411 (2007)
 (describing the conventional view of continuation bias and showing evidence inconsistent
 with that view in a sample of Illinois bankruptcies). For other accounts arguing that there
 is a procontinuation bias, see Julian R. Franks 8c Walter N. Torous, A Comparison of the
 U.K. and U.S. Bankruptcy Codes, 6 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 95, 101 (1993) (arguing that the
 U.S. bankruptcy system is systematically prodebtor because it has "strong incentives to
 maintain the firm as a going concern even when it is worth more in liquidation"); Lynn M.
 LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
 Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 99, 106-07 (1983) (noting that, under former ver-
 sion of Chapter 11, bankruptcy prcoeedings could not be for the sole purpose of
 liquidation).
 15. The debate has largely been framed in terms of "redistribution," but the choice is
 equally relevant here. Important articles in the debate are Louis Kaplow 8c Steven Shavell,
 Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23
 J. Legal Stud. 667, 674-76 (1994) (arguing that legal rules should be "efficient," and all
 redistribution should take place through the income tax) and Chris William Sanchirico,
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 invest and work, thereby wasting about $0.33 with each marginal dollar
 raised.16 However, by the "one-third rule," if deviating from an "efficient"
 legal rule results in a distortion that costs less than one-third of the
 amount of money that no longer needs to be raised through taxes, then a
 court should adopt that deviation.17 Indeed, that is the efficient legal
 rule. Using terminology developed in other work, this Article argues that
 what some might consider an "efficient" bankruptcy rule - maximizing
 return to shareholders - is actually merely an "i-efficient" legal rule.18
 That is, it is efficient only internally to the relations between firms and
 their creditors, investors, and other parties that underlie bankruptcy law.
 But it is not efficient considering the global effects of the rule, such as
 placing unemployed workers on programs for which taxpayers pay. This
 Article takes as its goal global efficiency, defined as the wealth produced
 by the entire economy, including the costs of other spending and tax
 programs impacted by legal rules the bankruptcy system has adopted.
 B. "Community Concerns') " ProceduraHsts " Versus ' Traditionalists " in Bankruptcy Law
 The debate in bankruptcy law about "efficiency" has been between
 "traditionalists," who support consideration of "community concerns,"19
 and "proceduralists," who want bankruptcy law to maximize the value of
 the assets leaving bankruptcy. The traditionalists, in part, point to
 congressional language that indicates promoting employment was a goal
 of bankruptcy law.20 Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that there is a
 "congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations."21 So the traditional-
 ists argue that bankruptcy judges should act to preserve employment in
 the name of these broad non-efficiency-based criteria.
 Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal
 Stud. 797, 805-06 (2000) (arguing that it can be efficient to redistribute through legal
 rules).
 16. See Ballard et al., supra note 5, at 135 (finding that marginal welfare cost from
 raising a dollar of tax revenue is $0.33, assuming a savings elasticity of 0.4 and a labor sup-
 ply elasticity of 0.15).
 17. Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule
 Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 Yale L.J. 2478, 2482-83
 (2014).
 18. Id. at 2483, 2487 (defining an i-efficient rule as a "rule that is efficient (i.e.,
 wealth-maximizing based on individuals' willingness to pay) in the narrow 'internal-to-
 legal-rule' context").
 19. "Community concerns" are conceptually distinct from the idea of shareholder
 representation in corporate governance. This Article proposes a remedial, not a structural,
 point.
 20. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy law traditionalists) .
 21. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983) (finding that
 property seized by the 1RS prior to filing a reorganization petition must be turned over to
 the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2012) and relying on congressional intent as evinced
 in legislative history, H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 82
 (1978)).
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 maximize the value of the firm exiting bankruptcy. They have argued
 that there has traditionally been a pro-reorganization or procontinuation
 bias relative to the efficient baseline.22 They point to the same Supreme
 Court cases and legislative history cited by the traditionalists as evidence
 of that bias. Law and economics scholars have argued that several
 bankruptcy rules lead to an inefficient procontinuation bias.23 For
 example, Professors Yeon-Koo Che and Alan Schwartz argue that the
 prohibition in § 365(e) (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Code on "ipso facto
 clauses," which excuse the solvent party from performance of a contract
 when the other party becomes insolvent, is inefficient.24
 This Article does not claim that there should be more reorganiza-
 tions relative to the status quo but rather that courts should time properly
 over the business cycle those reorganizations driven by a concern for em-
 ployment. When applying the normative framework of the proceduralists
 (i.e., pursuing efficiency), there should be some concern for employ-
 ment. Moreover, this concern should be considered within the context of
 the economy's current place within the business cycle.25 This Article is
 actually largely supportive of the law and economics literature criticizing
 procontinuation policies. It supports counter-cyclical and context-
 dependent employment-sustaining decisions rather than rules with a
 consistent procontinuation bias like ipso facto clauses that are "baked in"
 to bankruptcy law26 and that effectively "juice" the firm at the expense of
 creditors at all times.
 II. Model of Bankruptcy and Employment
 A. Background Macroeconomic Literature
 This Article is also part of a small, but growing, literature on how law
 should respond to macroeconomic concerns. For example, Professor Yair
 Listokin makes a forceful argument that the lack of macroeconomic con-
 siderations in tax law is quite problematic.27 In another example of this
 22. See supra note 14.
 23. See Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules
 and Inefficient Continuance, 15 J.L. Econ. 8c Org. 441, 462 (1999) (arguing that the
 prohibition in § 365(e)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code on ipso facto clauses is inefficient
 and may lead to firms continuing inefficient projects). Legislative history here supports
 the goal of reorganization. The Senate Report on the section says that the presence of ipso
 facto clauses "frequently hampers rehabilitation efforts." S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 59.
 24. Che 8c Schwartz, supa note 23, at 462.
 25. Since the normative framework is efficiency, issues of fairness do not come into
 play for those who have the bad luck of being creditors to a business that goes bankrupt
 during a time of high unemployment and therefore receive less under counter-cyclical
 bankruptcy rules.
 26. See Che 8c Schwartz, supra note 23, at 442.
 27. See Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of
 Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 Yale J. Reg. 45, 49-50 (2012).
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 emerging literature, this author has drawn two counterintuitive conclu-
 sions about how taxes should change during recessions: To increase em-
 ployment and ensure that those who most need jobs get them, tax cuts
 should favor employers, not employees, and the government should en-
 courage marginal workers to leave the labor force by subsidizing nonem-
 ployment.28 Finally, although not primarily focused on how varying
 macroeconomic conditions should affect the law, Professors Jonathan
 Masur and Eric Posner discuss how cost-benefit analysis could take into
 account regulations' effects on employment.29 This is the first paper that
 asks how bankruptcy should respond to macroeconomic concerns and
 the first to suggest how courts could take into account such concerns.
 This Article relies on an understanding of the economy and labor
 markets that differs from the traditional model in law and economics,
 which typically assumes that labor markets are "neoclassical." In
 neoclassical labor markets, prices (e.g., wages) adjust so that supply
 equals demand.30 There are no "frictions" in finding new jobs; that is, it
 does not take time or effort for an employer and an employee to find
 each other. Under these circumstances, it would be pointless to preserve
 firms with liquidation value greater than reorganization value. This
 would penalize creditors without improving circumstances for workers as
 a whole. Laid-off workers would simply immediately find new jobs. Some
 may have lower wages because their skills are no longer in as much de-
 mand, but there is no efficiency reason to keep them employed in their
 previous jobs. No market failure justifies deviating from the outcome that
 maximizes the value of the firm, and no positive externality results from
 keeping a worker in the job.31
 28. Zachary Liscow 8c William Gui Wools ton, How Income Taxes Should Change
 During Recessions, 70 Tax L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with the Columbia Law
 Review) . The intuition for the result is as follows: If recessions effectively result in a wage
 floor and therefore rationing of a fixed number of jobs, then subsidizing employers will
 create more jobs, while subsidizing employees will draw more marginal workers into the
 labor force without creating more jobs, making those who really need jobs compete with
 those who receive little surplus from working. By similar reasoning, subsidizing
 nonemployment draws marginal workers out of the labor force, making it easier for those
 who place a high value on attaining employment to get one of the fixed number of jobs
 available. Id. (manuscript at 4) .
 29. See Jonathan S. Masur 8c Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-
 Benefit Analysis, 98 Va. L. Rev. 579, 582 (2012) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis should
 consider employment effects) .
 30. See Neva Goodwin et al., Principles of Economics in Context 219-21 (Routledge
 2015) (2014) (describing the market-clearing mechanism of labor markets under
 neoclassical model).
 31. In neoclassical labor markets, there may be individuals who are unwilling to work
 for the market wage. Those persons exit the labor force. See id. (describing neoclassical
 labor markets generally) . The key difference between neoclassical labor markets and those
 considered here is that there is a set of workers who would be willing to work at the
 prevailing wage but are unable to find a job. There is an excess supply of workers, which
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 This Article builds on insights from macroeconomics showing that
 departing from these neoclassical assumptions reverses these conclu-
 sions.32 Although no specific model is required for the results here, these
 macroeconomics models provide useful conceptual frameworks for
 understanding how the results might arise. In general, bankruptcy serves
 the important function of reallocating capital and labor to more produc-
 tive uses.33 But this result does not necessarily apply in recessions.
 Whether due to sticky information,34 sticky wages,35 or some other cause,
 reallocation does not work as well during recessions. Capital is underuti-
 lized. Workers lose their jobs and then become unemployed; they are not
 reallocated. One way to understand this phenomenon is through the
 presence of sticky wages. Labor demand falls, but wages do not. As a re-
 sult, when workers are laid off, they are not re-employed. The economy
 stays in a recession, so capital too is underutilized. This market failure
 may justify "interference" with the value-maximizing role of bankruptcy.
 Two positive externalities result from keeping workers employed.
 First, the government does not have to incur spending on items like
 unemployment insurance required for unemployed workers; due to long
 unemployment durations, this spending is unusually high during reces-
 sions for each job lost.36 Second, as John Maynard Keynes argued in the
 first half of the twentieth century, keeping one worker employed results
 in a "multiplier," through which increased spending by one employed
 worker results in more employment, further increasing spending and
 therefore employment.37 Thus, spending a dollar to keep a worker
 employed is worth more than a dollar in increased economic output.38
 does not happen in neoclassical labor markets because the wage decreases until enough
 workers have exited the labor force to equilibrate the supply and demand of workers.
 32. See infra notes 34-35 (describing how sticky information or sticky wages can im-
 pact reallocation).
 33. See Jackson 8c Skeel, supra note 7, at 5-6 (explaining the effectiveness of bank-
 ruptcy law at reallocating assets to productive uses); see also Lucia Foster, John
 Haltiwanger 8c C. J. Krizan, Market Selection, Reallocation and Restructuring in the U.S.
 Retail Trade Sector in the 1990s, 88 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 748, 748-49 (2006) (noting the im-
 portance and dynamics of reallocation).
 34. See N. Gregory Mankiw 8c Ricardo Reis, Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A
 Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, 117 Q.J. Econ. 1295, 1296 (2002)
 (introducing the sticky-information model) .
 35. Sticky wages are traditionally assumed in the Keynesian model. See David Romer,
 Advanced Macroeconomics 242-44 (3d ed. 2006) (presenting a modern rendition of the
 Keynesian model).
 36. Henry S. Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession: Historical Perspective from the
 Displaced Workers Survey, 1984-2010, at 1-2 (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 5696, 2011) (on
 file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the length of unemployment duration).
 37. See Mankiw, Macroeconomics, supra note 2, at 262-64 (illustrating how govern-
 ment purchases cause a "multiplier").
 38. Note that Keynesian views, though widely held among economists, are not univer-
 sally held. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Opinion, Government Spending Is No Free Lunch,
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 This effect does not occur during times of low unemployment. At
 times and places of "low" unemployment, there are still unemployed
 workers. When a liquidated firm then lays off workers, they will still be
 unemployed for some period of time. However, this "frictional" employ-
 ment results in what economists call the "natural rate of unemployment,"
 defined as the level of unemployment resulting from job-matching fric-
 tions in "normal" times, when the economy is neither stressed nor over-
 heated.39 It ought not be addressed through bankruptcy law because
 there is little reason to think that preserving the jobs in a bankrupt firm
 would actually increase overall employment: That frictional employment
 is to a large extent inevitable, and preserving more jobs at bankrupt firms
 would do little to reduce it.40 Rather, without the Keynesian multiplier
 that results when the economy is operating below its normal capacity and
 employment is above the natural rate, it is not worth the loss to creditors
 and the distortion to creditor behavior that results from preserving jobs
 at the expense of creditors. That distortion itself is likely to reduce em-
 ployment. For the same reason, there are costs to having employment
 protections that make it difficult to lay off workers, as such protections
 may actually increase unemployment.41
 A separate issue in deciding when and where bankruptcy law should
 consider employment is whether it ought to consider employment in
 places of high unemployment when the national unemployment rate is
 low. This is an interesting question, but one that is beyond the scope of
 this Article, since the underlying economic causes of the localized unem-
 ployment are less clear. This Article will examine the presence of
 temporarily high unemployment rates in certain locations as a reason to
 consider employment effects more strongly, but it will use an elevated
 national unemployment as the trigger for purposes of counter-cyclical
 bankruptcy rules.
 B. Basic Setup
 To understand how to implement counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules,
 compare the costs and benefits of preserving a job through reorganiza-
 tion instead of liquidation in bankruptcy.42 The first key variable is the
 Wall St. J. (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.wsj. com/articles/SBl 2325861 8204604599 (on file
 with the Columbia Law Review) .
 39. See Mankiw, Macroeconomics, supra note 2 at 155-58, 175 (defining the natural
 rate of unemployment) .
 40. See id. at 159 ("Some frictional unemployment is inevitable in a changing economy." ) .
 41. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment
 Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 915, 917,
 929-32 (2001) (using the Americans with Disabilities Act to show that employment protec-
 tions, at least in this context, can increase unemployment for the affected group).
 42. This analysis considers only a binary choice between liquidation and reorganiza-
 tion. It does not consider the possibility that preserving some jobs in a firm may be
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 average cost of preserving a job for a year (a "job-year") through bank-
 ruptcy (C), which this Article defines as the difference between the
 liquidation value (L) and the reorganization value (R) of a firm, divided
 by the number of job-years in the economy preserved by reorganizing
 instead of liquidating ( W ).43 To be clear, both L and R consider only the
 return to creditors and, if relevant, equity. Thus,
 L-R
 c ~ w
 In some bankruptcies C will be large, either because of the large dif-
 ference between liquidation and reorganization value or because of the
 small number of workers whose jobs are preserved. In other bankruptcies
 C will be small, either because of a small difference between liquidation
 and reorganization value or because a large number of workers' jobs are
 preserved. The key concern for a bankruptcy judge or policymaker is the
 level of C below which firms should be reorganized despite the loss to
 creditors. Law and economics scholars have generally argued that
 whenever C is greater than 0, the firm should be liquidated.
 In deciding on this threshold level of C, some government actor - a
 bankruptcy judge or otherwise - should compare the efficiency cost of
 the loss to creditors with the benefits of preserving employment for W
 workers. Presented below are two methods for measuring the benefits of
 preserving employment.
 C. Two Methods for Estimating the Value of Maintaining Employment
 1. Method One : The Shadow Value of Maintaining Employment. - The
 first method for estimating the value of a saved job uses the "shadow
 value" of a job that is implied by the amount the government recently
 spent to maintain employment.44 That is, a way to determine the value to
 the government of maintaining employment is to see how much it actu-
 ally spent to do just that. Presumably the government would take into
 account all benefits - aggregate stimulus, increased tax payments,
 avoided social-insurance and income-support payments, and anything
 else that members of Congress believe is important to their constituents.
 The analysis here focuses on the value of preserving a job during the
 Great Recession through the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act.
 Estimates of the amount that the government spent to preserve a job vary
 cheaper than preserving other jobs, which could lead to conclusions like partial
 reorganizations.
 43. W is based on the employment after reorganization, not before, which is im-
 portant since reorganizations often result in layoffs.
 44. One paper taking a similar approach is Orley Ashenfelter & Michael Greenstone,
 Using Mandated Speed Limits to Measure the Value of a Statistical Life, 112 J. Pol. Econ.
 226, 227 (2004) (using the preferences revealed by speed limits adopted by political pro-
 cesses to measure the value of a statistical life) .
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 widely, from an estimate of $26, 000, 45 up to the Administration's own esti-
 mate of $125, 000, 46 and congressional Republicans' estimates of an infi-
 nite cost.47 This analysis implicitly makes two rather heroic assumptions:
 first, that the government was optimizing; second, that it knew (or had a
 good guess about) the cost of its actions. Nevertheless, the government's
 best guess in 2009 may be the best guess now. Since the Administration's
 estimate of $125,000 to maintain a job-year is the official estimate and is
 rather high (despite the Administration's incentives to make it seem
 low), this Article will use this figure as a baseline assumption.
 By this calculation, a firm should be reorganized when the efficiency
 cost resulting from paying less to creditors is less than the efficiency cost
 resulting from G, the government spending to create or preserve a job
 for a year. That is, a firm should be reorganized when:
 (L-R'
 Efficiency cost y J < Efficiency Cost{G)
 Taking the right-hand side of the inequality first, the efficiency cost
 of government spending to create a job-year is equal to (a) the gross cost
 of raising a dollar of government funds minus (b) the social value of the
 spending (of course, beyond the benefits of job preservation, which are
 present on both sides of the inequality) . The gross cost of raising a dollar
 to preserve a job is a well-studied concept in economics, known as the
 marginal cost of public funds (MCPF),48 which is equal to the extra dol-
 lar raised plus the distortion to working and investing that results from
 raising that dollar of revenue. Then the social value of the good (e.g., a
 road), service (e.g., medical care), or transfer payment (e.g., Social
 Security payment) provided must be subtracted from the MCPF to find
 the efficiency cost. This Article defines Value{G ) as the value of public
 spending, ignoring the benefits of job preservation. Thus, the relevant
 comparison is that a firm should be reorganized when:
 (L-R'
 Efficiency cost y j < MCPF(G ) - Value{G )
 45. Chodorow-Reich et al., supra note 4, at 137.
 46. The Council of Economic Advisers published a report stating that the Recovery
 Act saved or created an average of 1.6 million jobs a year for four years, produced by about
 $800 billion in spending through the end of 2013. Council of Econ. Advisers, supra note 4,
 at 10 tbl.3. Dividing $800 billion by the the product of 4 and 1.6 million yields $125,000
 per job-year. For simplicity, this calculation ignores discounting.
 47. See Did the Stimulus Create Jobs?, FactCheck.org (Sept. 27, 2010) , www.factcheck.org/
 2010/ 09/did-the^timulus-createjobs [http://perma.cc/9TT8-RD67] (quoting Republican can-
 didates who claim that the economic stimulus package did not create or save any jobs).
 The claim that the Recovery Act saved or created zero jobs amounts to a claim of an
 infinite cost, since dividing cost by the number of jobs created or saved is infinite if the
 claimed number of jobs is zero.
 48. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & James R. Hines Jr., Taxation and Economic
 Efficiency, in 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1347, 1385 (Alan J. Auerbach 8c Martin
 Feldstein eds., 2002).
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 Turning to the left-hand side of the inequality, the efficiency cost
 arising from the reduced payments to the creditors comes from two com-
 ponents. First, future creditors are less likely to lend to businesses since
 they know that they may lose out if there is a bankruptcy, harming busi-
 nesses and causing another distortion.49 But second, the creditors in the
 bankruptcy at hand get less money. That money is lost to the world. That
 is, there is a crucial difference between the efficiency cost of reorganizing
 a firm that is worth more when liquidated and taxing to pay for job crea-
 tion. In the case of an "inefficient" reorganization, no equivalent public
 good, service, or transfer is provided. Assets are simply deployed in a
 manner that reduces returns to creditors - pure deadweight loss (again,
 ignoring the benefits of job gains, which government spending also pro-
 duces). Hence, no equivalent of the value of government spending
 should be subtracted from the cost to creditors. Therefore, because there
 is no offsetting gain from spending apart from the employment benefits,
 the efficiency cost of the "inefficient" reorganization is the full cost of
 the financial loss to creditors plus the cost of the distortion to their
 behavior.
 To implement the rule in practice, these values need to be esti-
 mated. As noted earlier, the MCPF is a well-studied estimate. The best
 estimate is that it costs society about $1.33 for the government to raise a
 dollar of revenue.50 Estimating Value(fi ) is more difficult, since the
 spending could take many forms. Determining the value of government
 transfers is easy: The value of a lump-sum payment to an individual of
 one dollar is simply one dollar (again, ignoring any employment-creating
 benefits). Assessing the value of a road is harder; it could range from
 zero dollars for a "road to nowhere" to more than a dollar for a valuable
 public good.51 This Article conservatively assumes as an illustrative
 baseline that the value of a dollar of government spending is a dollar,
 since this is true for at least the large portion of government stimulus
 spending used for tax rebates.
 Estimating the left-hand side of the equation involves somewhat
 more guesswork. The efficiency cost of changing firms' investment behav-
 ior ex ante in anticipation of lower returns upon bankruptcy is not well
 known.52 However, these lower returns are essentially an expected tax on
 49. Note that this distortion would likely be somewhat mitigated by the reduced
 wages that employers could pay to employees with counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules. Since
 workers would value the increased insurance over keeping their jobs in recessions, they
 would demand lower wages, making businesses more profitable and making creditors
 more willing to lend.
 50. Ballard et al., supra note 5, at 135 & tbl.3 (estimating a marginal excess burden of
 $0.33 per additional dollar of tax revenue raised, for a total cost of $1.33 to society).
 51. Presumably, though, roads of sufficient value would have been built before the
 recession.
 52. Indeed, the effects could be heterogeneous, as they differentially affect different
 types of creditors, investors, and borrowers. In the lead up to a potential recession, this
 proposal could tighten credit to firms at risk of bankruptcy because the proposal would
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 creditors. Though the ratio of the creditor distortion to the MCPF will be
 part of a parameter in the formula, as a baseline illustration, assume for
 simplicity that the "tax" resulting from paying less back to firms is equal
 to the MCPF, which incorporates the financial loss to creditors and the
 resulting distortion to their behavior.
 In this Article, a represents the ratio of the distortion from general
 taxation (i.e., the MCPF minus the value of government spending) to the




 Under the illustrative assumptions used here, a = 0.25.53
 The next step to understanding when a firm should be reorganized
 is to determine W9 the number of job-years of employment that results
 from preserving a firm. Two types of jobs can be preserved: direct and
 indirect jobs. Direct jobs are those directly saved at the firm (and its com-
 petitors). Indirect jobs are those that result from the Keynesian multi-
 plier, whereby those employed consume goods and services, resulting in
 additional employment.
 To measure the direct employment effects of a layoff, one must con-
 sider at least two ancillary effects. First, more workers may be hired else-
 where as the products that would have been sold by the liquidated firm
 are produced elsewhere. Second, laid-off workers compete with other
 unemployed workers for a limited number of jobs, making it harder for
 those other unemployed workers to get jobs. Assume as a baseline that
 these two effects just offset each other, so that the number of jobs saved
 at a firm is a good approximation of the total direct jobs created in the
 economy. This assumption will be valid in some contexts but not in oth-
 ers. For example, if the firm went bankrupt due to foreign competition,
 then at least in the short run few American workers may be hired as a
 result, since foreign producers would be picking up the slack. In that
 case, the true total effect on unemployment may be underestimated, be-
 cause the laid-off workers from the bankrupt firm would be competing
 reduce expected payouts from those firms to creditors in the case of bankruptcy. Such an
 impact might reduce the extent to which bankruptcy judges should seek to reorganize
 rather than liquidate firms in the name of preserving employment because tightening
 credit could worsen a recession.
 53. The reason is that Efficiency cost < MCPF(G) - Value(G ) implies, following
 the argument above, that < MCPF(G ) - Value(G ). Consider that it costs $1.33 to
 transfer a dollar of government-raised money, which has a dollar of non-job-related bene-
 fits, while (by assumption) it costs $1.33 to transfer a dollar from creditors, which has no
 nomjob-related benefits. Thus, MCPF < MCPF(G) -Value(G) implies that 1.33^ <
 1.33G -G. Rearranging and simplifying yields ^ < 0.25G. Thus, a = 0.25. Put differently,
 the ratio of costs from raising a dollar of government-raised money compared to raising a
 dollar through transferring one from creditors is (1.33 - 1)/(1.33) = 0.25.
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 with and increasing the unemployment rate for existing unemployed
 workers without the bankruptcy creating any new jobs at other American
 producers.
 The number of direct jobs preserved then must be converted into a
 number of direct job-years preserved, since some employees quickly find
 jobs and others do not. The way to estimate the total effect on unemploy-
 ment is to follow laid-off workers and see how long they stay unem-
 ployed.54 Ideally, one would estimate time to re-employment for workers
 laid off due to bankruptcy, since workers laid off under such circum-
 stances may stay unemployed for longer than those let go for other rea-
 sons. Workers laid off due to bankruptcy may be unemployed for longer,
 both because their skills are less likely to be in demand and because the
 local labor market may be glutted with unemployed workers; alterna-
 tively, they may be unemployed for a shorter period of time because the
 layoffs are less likely to be tied to poor performance. The best available
 evidence, though, is on "displaced" workers - that is, those laid off be-
 cause their plant or company closed or moved, their position or shift was
 abolished, there was insufficient work, or a similar reason.55 Work by la-
 bor economist Henry Färber shows that workers laid off during the Great
 Recession had an average unemployment duration after layoff of at least
 fifty weeks; many workers laid off then still had not been re-employed
 when they were surveyed years later.56 The Article labels as I the average
 unemployment duration avoided by directly preserving a job through
 reorganization.
 The indirect employment effects then need to be added to these di-
 rect employment effects. Prior work estimates the size of this Keynesian
 "multiplier" during the Great Recession to be around two.57 That is,
 every worker directly employed results in another worker indirectly
 employed. The number of workers directly employed as a result of
 reorganizing instead of liquidating is denoted D and the multiplier is
 54. Labor economists calculate this using the Kaplan-Meier survival curve. See Bruce
 D. Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, 58 Econometrica 757,
 762-66 (1990) (applying the Kaplan-Meier survival curve to unemployment).
 55. Färber, supra note 36. This analysis constructs this estimate of fifty weeks as fol-
 lows: Färber shows that 43.7% of workers had been re-employed by the time of the survey;
 they had an average unemployment duration of 13.4 weeks. Id. at 37-38 app. at tbls.10 &
 12. The remaining 56.3% of workers were not re-employed at the time of the survey. Id. at
 37 app. at tbl.10. Since the survey asked if workers had been laid off over the previous
 three years, the approximate average unemployment duration of these workers is 1.5
 years. Of course, this is a substantial underestimate of the true duration of unemployment,
 since this account does not count any unemployment after the date of the survey.
 Weighting 13.4 weeks and 1.5 years by the appropriate fractions yields an average
 unemployment duration after displacement of 49.8 weeks.
 56. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Note that "unemployed' includes
 those who exit the labor market, which is not the customary way of counting those who
 exit labor markets.
 57. See, e.g., Chodorow-Reich et al., supra note 4, at 138.
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 denoted m. Estimates of the effect of government spending on
 employment already include the indirect jobs, so no multiplier should be
 added to the government spending side of the equation. Accordingly, a
 firm should be reorganized when
 L-R
 "7w Dim - <aG' 7w Dim
 or
 L-R
 - - < almG = J ,
 where J is the value of preserving a direct job at a firm through
 reorganization. That is, a firm should be reorganized when the cost of
 L-R
 preserving a job there is less than the value of persving a job there
 (/)•
 Using the baseline set of assumptions that (1) "taxing" creditors and
 taxpayers yields the same distortion; (2) a dollar of taxpayer spending is
 valued at a dollar; (3) the only benefit of reorganizing firms when L > R
 is job creation (yielding, along with (1) and (2), a = 0.25); (4) the num-
 ber of job-years resulting from a reorganization instead of liquidation is
 equal to the fifty weeks of unemployment for each worker who would
 have been employed by the reorganized firm (Z = 50/52); (5) the jobs
 multiplier m equals two; and (6) the government's "shadow value" of a
 job during the recession (G) is $125,000 per job, then J = $60,096.58 That
 is, a firm is worth preserving when the cost per direct job to creditors is
 less than $60,096.59 Of course, one can make different assumptions and
 better estimates may arise, but the framework remains useful even if the
 particular numbers are changed.
 a. Application to the Chrysler Bankruptcy. - The Chrysler bankruptcy
 provides an illustrative application of Method One.60 Admittedly, the
 Chrysler case is much more complicated than the binary choice between
 reorganization and liquidation to preserve jobs, as it involved a govern-
 ment bailout (at least temporarily using taxpayer money) and a
 questionable distribution to creditors.61 Nevertheless, Chrysler's bank-
 58. See infra Table 1.
 59. This analysis leaves out other potentially relevant factors. For example, the "tax"
 that creditors face is collected during the recession, which may be more disruptive than
 taxes collected years after the recession, when taxpayers are likely to pay the bill for stimu-
 lus programs.
 60. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 576 F.3d 108 (2d
 Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087
 (2009), vacated and appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Chrysler LLC, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir.
 2010) (mem.) (per curiam).
 61. In particular, the Chrysler bankruptcy has been criticized for violating the statu-
 tory prioritization of creditor repayment. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of
 Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors, 18 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev.
 305, 306 (2010) ("It may seem . . . that money otherwise available to repay. . . secured
 creditors was withheld by the purchaser to satisfy unsecured obligations owed the UAW.");
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 ruptcy proceedings have been widely viewed as exhibiting a procontinua-
 tion bias, and an estimate using this methodology of the value of
 maintaining its employment during the Great Recession is instructive of
 the significant stakes involved in counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules.62 Af-
 ter its bankruptcy, Chrysler had over 40,000 employees.63 Assuming that
 all of those employees would have been laid off with a liquidation, with
 an average unemployment spell of fifty weeks and a cost per job of about
 $60,000, the value of this maintained employment is $2.4 billion. Under
 this analysis, if Chrysler had been worth up to $2.4 billion more liqui-
 dated than reorganized, it still would have been efficient to reorganize.
 The estimate for Chrysler could be a substantial under- or overesti-
 mate. It may be an underestimate because Chrysler may have an unusu-
 ally large supply chain, which may have yielded many more layoffs.
 Indeed, Ford argued in favor of the bailout of Chrysler and GM in part in
 order to maintain this industrial ecology.64 In addition, because Chrysler
 was such a large employer, the glut of workers would have been unusually
 large and geographically concentrated,65 likely leading to especially pro-
 longed unemployment. On the other hand, it may be an overestimate
 because distinct pieces of Chrysler may have maintained their operations
 following liquidation. Also, foreign and domestic car producers operat-
 ing in the United States may have quickly ramped up production - and
 employment - to make up for the loss of Chrysler. However, unless the
 job-loss estimate is far too low, the large magnitude of the value of the
 jobs at stake is clear.
 2. Method Two: The Bottom-Up Approach. - An alternative to using the
 "shadow value" approach is to reconstruct the social benefit of saving a
 job based on the components of that social benefit. This is the approach
 of Method Two; however, even if Method One is used, it is instructive to
 understand what underlies the value of these job-preserving expendi-
 Mark J. Roe 8c David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 727, 733
 (2010) ("Unsecured retiree claims were promised well over 50 cents on the dollar, along
 with control of the New Chrysler, and unsecured trade creditors were promised full pay-
 ment. The secured creditors, however, were getting 29 cents on the dollar.").
 62. See Roe 8c Skeel, supra note 61, at 767 (discussing the issues associated with the
 Chrysler bankruptcy) .
 63. Chrysler had 47,326 employees on December 31, 2009, though these were not all
 in the United States, which is why the 40,000 figure is a more accurate estimate of their overall U.S.
 employment Chrysler Grp. LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Dec. 31, 2012),
 http://www.sec.gOv/Archives/edgar/data/1513153/000119312514086806/d648678dl0k.htm
 [http://perma.cc/FC93-AKKP] .
 64. Jon Healey, Ford's CEO Has No Regrets About Call for Bailout, L.A. Times (Apr.
 19, 2012) , http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/19/news/larol40rd-ceo-rebuts-mitt-romney-auto-
 bankruptcy-view-20120418 [http://perma.cc/5JPV-CGWW] .
 65. See Our Locations, Fiat Chrysler Autos., http://www.fcagroupcareers.com/
 OurBusiness/OurLocation/Pages/home.aspx [http://perma.cc/D8Y2-B7WN] (last visited July
 29, 2016) (showing that all U.S. plants are located in Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, and
 Indiana) .
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 tures. This value primarily comes from two sources: from avoiding other
 government expenditures and from Keynesian stimulus.66
 First, when a worker becomes unemployed, she is served by a wide
 variety of programs.67 She is usually eligible for unemployment
 insurance, which pays a certain fraction of a laid-off worker's wages.68 If
 the individual is poor enough and meets asset tests, she may be eligible
 for: Supplemental Security Income, which provides income for the very
 poor; the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, which provides
 food assistance for the very poor; Medicaid, which provides health
 insurance for the very poor; and Temporary Assistance for Needy
 Families, which provides cash assistance for poor families.69
 Moreover, with regard to lower-income individuals, the government
 collects less tax revenue, especially as individuals become eligible for the
 Earned Income Tax Credit. After a waiting period, workers may be
 eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides
 payments to individuals who can claim a disability; there is strong evi-
 dence that individuals who used to work but who get laid off often sign
 up for benefits under SSDI.70 Adding these various components together
 for workers who are unemployed for an average of at least fifty weeks
 likely yields substantial sums for the government. These sums could be
 estimated using the Survey of Income and Program Participation, which
 tracks government payments to individuals and even distinguishes be-
 66. Note that the "worker's surplus" that is maintained by sustaining employment is
 implicitly included in the forgone cost of Keynesian stimulus. When jobs are rationed and
 too "few" people are employed, spending one dollar to preserve a job preserves worker's
 surplus - that is, the difference between the amount that the worker is paid and the
 amount she would be willing to be paid to take the job. With workers willing to work at
 prevailing wages but unable to find jobs, this worker's surplus is left on the table because
 of the unemployment. Thus, the value of Keynesian stimulus would reflect this benefit of
 sustaining employment.
 67. This section covers only federal programs. State programs would add additional
 expenditures.
 68. Mankiw, Macroeconomics supra note 2, at 160 ("Although the precise terms of
 the program differ from year to year and state to state, a typical worker covered by unem-
 ployment insurance in the United States receives 50 percent of his or her former wages for
 26 weeks.").
 69. See generally Shelley K Irving 8c Tracy A. Loveless, U.S. Census Bureau,
 Dynamics of Economic Weil-Being: Participation in Government Programs, 2009-2012:
 Who Gets Assistance? 1-3 (2015), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
 publications/ 20 15/demo/p70-l 41. pdf [http://perma.cc/468T-534C] (Presenting data on
 the "participation and characteristics of people who received benefits from . . . means-
 tested assistance programs").
 70. See generally Dan Black, Kermit Daniel 8c Seth Sanders, The Impact of Economic
 Conditions on Participation in Disability Programs: Evidence from the Coal Boom and
 Bust, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 27, 47 (2002) (examining the relationship between labor-force
 participation and use of SSDI benefits) .
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 tween those laid off due to bankruptcy and other reasons.71 As used
 below, S represents the total expected social-insurance and safety-net-pro-
 gram costs per worker.72
 These forgone government expenditures provide only a lower
 bound on the value of preserving employment because we must also ac-
 count for Keynesian stimulus effects. During recessions, governments
 often try to maintain and increase employment for Keynesian reasons.
 The value of preserving firms teetering on the edge of liquidation is
 particularly strong when there is a lack of "shovel-ready" projects. Even
 President Barack Obama acknowledged that it was difficult finding such
 projects to get money out the door and people employed.73 Having the
 firm already in place makes it a particularly good pressure point for main-
 taining employment because the firm is able to do so without the lag in
 spending and employment that often results from government programs.
 The government is willing to pay a certain amount of Keynesian stimu-
 lus - call this number K - purely to avoid the harms from low employ-
 ment levels, including the loss in economic output and harm to those
 who cannot find jobs.
 Under this approach, the government would compare the efficiency
 costs of not maximizing the value to creditors with the efficiency costs of
 raising the funds for social-insurance payments (5) and Keynesian stimu-
 lus (tf):74
 fL-R'
 Efficiency cost < MCPF(S + tf) - Value{S + tf)
 Or, following the same reasoning as in the previous subsection, a
 firm should be reorganized when:
 71. Survey of Income and Program Participation, U.S. Census Bureau, http://
 www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/ [http://perma.cc/PST2-Z6ZR] (last visited July
 29,2016).
 72. The partial funding of social-insurance programs by state and local governments
 raises the question of whether federal expenditures should be treated differently from
 state expenditures for purposes of calculating the MCPF. This Article takes the view of
 global efficiency - that is, federal and state expenditures should be treated the same,
 notwithstanding the fact that state programs may have a different MCPF. An alternative
 approach might incorporate the generosity of programs like Medicaid and unemployment
 insurance in the state in which workers live.
 73. David Jackson, Obama Jokes About 'Shovel-Ready Projects,' USA Today (June 13,
 2011, 6:07 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/06/
 obama-jokes-about-shovel-ready-projects/ l#.UxDdc_ldVUU [http://perma.cc/8CQX-XLVE] .
 The goal of having shovel-ready projects also motivates Martin Shubik's proposal to have
 experts prepare a list of shovel-ready projects in case a recession should hit See Martin Shubik,
 Levy Econ. Inst of Bard Coll., A Proposal for a Federal Employment Reserve Authority 2 (2009),
 http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_09__05.pdf [http://perma.cc/X562-2Y9P] .
 74. Keynesian stimulus K only includes spending that is justified by its stimulus-
 generating effect, not spending justified on the basis of reducing government expendi-
 tures. To count job-creation costs justified on the basis of avoiding government expendi-
 tures would be to count those expenditures twice.
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 L-R
 - - - < alm(S + K )
 Though this is a good formula for understanding the components
 underlying the more comprehensive measure described in Method One,
 the measurement difficulties for Method Two are substantially greater
 than for Method One. Thus, while Method Two is useful for decompos-
 ing the "shadow value" used in Method One into its two components, the
 remainder of the Article focuses on Method One.
 D. Accounting for Context Dependence
 This Article argues that bankruptcy law should act to preserve em-
 ployment when the unemployment rate is high. This section explores the
 conditions under which employment-preserving bankruptcy rules should
 come into effect. It describes how a policymaker could measure /, the
 "shadow value" of preserving a job through bankruptcy in Method One.
 Economic theory suggests that when unemployment is high, sustaining
 employment and spending has a Keynesian multiplier, which does not
 exist when unemployment is low.75 The positive externality for other
 workers of keeping workers employed exists when unemployment is high
 but not when it is low. Thus, to determine times when overall unemploy-
 ment can be reduced through bankruptcy law, a judge or policymaker
 should measure the unemployment rate for the labor market relevant for
 a worker in a particular time, place, and line of work. Fortunately, as this
 section emphasizes, the information necessary to make such measure-
 ments is available to decisionmakers on a timely basis.
 The first input into the relevant unemployment rate that a worker
 faces is the national unemployment rate.76 The overall macroeconomy is
 the primary driver of unemployment and thus an important indicator for
 how much a job saved in bankruptcy will reduce overall unemployment.
 Furthermore, workers can change location and professions, so looking
 beyond the worker's narrow context is important. Fortunately, unemploy-
 ment data are publicly released and available to bankruptcy judges or
 other policymakers with little lag, thereby making nearly current infor-
 75. See supra note 31 (describing the functioning of supply and demand in
 neoclassical labor markets).
 76. Headline unemployment rates typically do not include among the unemployed
 the "discouraged" workers who have left the labor market due to the poor state of the
 economy. See Labor Force Characteristics from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of
 Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gOv/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#discouraged [http://perma.cc/
 C7GZ-YKQ4] (last visited July 29, 2016). Some believe that these workers should be
 included in the unemployment rate. See, e.g., Christopher Matthews, The Unemployment
 Report Wasn't Rigged, but It's Not Accurate, Either, Time (Oct. 16, 2012),
 http://business.time.com/20 12/10/1 6/the-unemployment-report-wasnt-rigged-but-its-not-
 accurate-either/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that the number of
 discouraged workers is an important macroeconomic employment statistic). However, their
 absence does not matter for this analysis as long as the percentage of workers who are
 discouraged at a given measured unemployment rate is the same across different recessions.
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 mation available to decisionmakers and improving the quality of deci-
 sionmaking. In particular, the Bureau of Labor Statistics releases its
 estimate of the national unemployment data for the middle of the
 previous month on the first Friday of each month.77
 The second input into the unemployment rate that a worker faces is
 the timing in the business cycle: The level of the unemployment rate
 alone is not a sufficient piece of information. Focusing on reducing
 unemployment is more important at the beginning of the recession, when
 there are more months in the near term with high unemployment.
 Although neither bankruptcy judges nor anyone else has a crystal ball
 showing how unemployment will change with time, the Federal Reserve's
 unemployment forecasts give an indication of future economic conditions.78
 A third consideration is the appropriate geographic definition of the
 "macroeconomy." Over time, people move to places of low unemploy-
 ment from places of high unemployment.79 But, especially in the short
 run, the United States does not have one national labor market but ra-
 ther many submarkets. So bankruptcy law needs to choose the relevant
 macroeconomy, which may be as disaggregated as the metropolitan area
 or as aggregated as the whole country. Which is more appropriate de-
 pends on the relevant labor market for the worker, and that in turn de-
 pends on how mobile workers are. Precisely determining how to weigh
 local versus national unemployment rates is beyond the scope of this
 Article. Both, however, are relevant to this Article given limited mobility.
 Estimates of local unemployment rates are also available at a high
 frequency and with little lag. The Bureau of Labor Statistics releases state
 and metropolitan-area unemployment estimates for the previous month
 in the middle of the following month.80
 77. In addition, the unemployment data are not revised subsequendy. The unemploy-
 ment data come from the Current Population Survey of individuals, which is complete by
 the time the unemployment data are released. Labor Force Statistics from the Current
 Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
 LNS1 4000000 [http://perma.cc/6GAV-BN6D] [hereinafter Bureau of Labor Statistics,
 Current Labor Force Statistics] (last visited July 29, 2016). At the same time the
 unemployment data are released, data on employment are released. See Current
 Employment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/ces/ [http://perma.cc/
 RP5Q-LJQX] (last visited July 29, 2016). These data come from a survey of establishments,
 and these numbers are revised over the coming two months based on a census of
 establishments. BLS Information, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/
 bls/empsitquickguide.htm [http://perma.cc/KQ42J2MH] (last visited Aug. 19,2016).
 78. A recent projection is available at: Advance Release of Table 1 of the Summary of
 Economic Projections to Be Released with the FOMC Minutes, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
 Reserve Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20140319.htm
 [http://perma.cc/A8VZ-UF8T] (last visited July 29, 2016).
 79. See, e.g., Christopher A. Pissarides & Jonathan Wadsworth, Unemployment and
 the Inter-Regional Mobility of Labour, 99 Econ. J. 739, 753 (1989).
 80. Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.
 gov/lau/news.htm [http://perma.cc/KP8N-8EPW] (last visited July 29, 2016) (providing
 local-area unemployment statistics).
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 Finally, the type of worker who would be laid off should also play a
 role in determining the contexts in which employment-preserving bank-
 ruptcy law would be most valuable. Just as there is not one national labor
 market geographically, there are distinct labor markets for different types
 of workers. For example, in the recent downturn, job prospects for high-
 skilled workers were substantially stronger than those for low-skilled
 workers.81 Thus, in such a downturn, government expenditures on high-
 skilled workers will tend to be lower and the macrostimulus benefits from
 preserving their jobs will be lower, since they are likely to be employed
 relatively quickly even without help from bankruptcy law.82 Data on
 unemployment rates by type of worker are available as quickly as the
 national unemployment rate. In the same first-Friday-of-the-month data
 release, the Bureau of Labor Statistics also releases unemployment by
 sector, race, sex, age, educational attainment, and other features that
 could be taken into account by bankruptcy law.83
 III. Implementing Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law
 This Article argues for bankruptcy law's inclusion of a targeted con-
 cern for employment preservation, not the general pro-reorganization
 policy supported by the Supreme Court and some bankruptcy scholars.84
 Thus, ideally pro-reorganization features would not be "baked in" to the
 system regardless of the state of the economy. This section proposes ways
 in which the bankruptcy system could incorporate counter-cyclical bank-
 ruptcy rules.
 81. See, e.g., Anthony P. Carnevale & Nicole Smith, Georgetown Univ. Ctr. on Educ.
 8c the Workforce, The Midwest Challenge: Matching Jobs with Education in the Post-
 Recession Economy 4 (2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED525299.pdf [http://
 perma.cc/62K4-SKZR] (highlighting that job prospects coming out of the 2008 recession
 were more favorable for skilled workers with postsecondary credentials) .
 82. In addition, poorer workers have a higher marginal propensity to consume, lead-
 ing to greater macrostimulus benefits. See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of
 Employment, Interest, and Money 126 (1964) (noting that the multiplier is larger in
 poorer communities) .
 83. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Status of the Civilian
 Population 25 Years and Over by Educational Attainment, http://www.bls.gov/
 news. release/empsit.t04. htm [http://perma.cc/4463-QEV7] (last visited July 29, 2016)
 (providing unemployment data by educational attainment); Press Release, Bureau of
 Labor Statistics, Unemployed Persons by Industry and Class of Worker, Not Seasonally
 Adjusted, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.tl4.htm [http://perma.cc/9XZR-LTL2]
 (last visited July 29, 2016) (providing unemployment data by industry); Labor Force
 Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Household Data Seasonally Adjusted: A-10.
 Unemployment Rates by Age, Sex, and Marital Status, Seasonally Adjusted, Bureau of
 Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseealO.htm [http://perma.cc/
 4AS7-9AL9] (last visited July 29, 2016) (providing unemployment data by age, sex, and
 marital status) .
 84. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (noting pro-reorganization policy
 announced by Supreme Court and citing scholars that support such a policy) .
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 A. Implementation Using § 1112(b) Under Current Statute
 One important point at which bankruptcy judges choose between
 liquidating and reorganizing a firm arises when a party in interest files a
 motion to convert from a reorganization to a liquidation for "cause" un-
 der § 1112(b).85 This section provides that, "on request of a party in
 interest," a court may convert a Chapter 1 1 case to a Chapter 7 case for
 cause, depending on what "is in the best interests of creditors and the
 estate."86 "Cause" is then defined in § 1112(b)(4).87 One commonly in-
 voked type of "cause" is that there will be "substantial or continuing loss
 to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood
 of rehabilitation."88 The judge has substantial discretion over the mean-
 ing of "reasonable."89 Although the statute does not suggest an explicit
 comparison of the liquidation and reorganization values, the macroeco-
 nomic context should enter the calculus for defining when the probabil-
 ity of rehabilitation crosses the threshold of reasonableness; that
 probability could be lower in times when preserving employment is
 important.90
 Structural bias in bankruptcy law leads to firm managers filing "too
 many" reorganization petitions, effectively giving judges the opportunity
 to choose which should be liquidations and which reorganizations. Firm
 managers file the vast majority of bankruptcy filings, and they tend to
 prefer Chapter 11 reorganizations over Chapter 7 liquidations.91 This
 preference creates an agency problem that drives the structural bias in
 favor of reorganization petitions. Since firm managers wish to keep their
 jobs, and managers are more likely to keep their jobs in a reorganization
 than in a liquidation, it is widely believed that there is a strong bias to-
 ward filing using Chapter 11 instead of Chapter 7, even when the
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012).
 86. Id. § 1112(b)(1).
 87. Id. § 1112(b)(4).
 88. Id. §1112 (b)(4) (A).
 89. See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949, 981
 (1985) (noting that reasonableness invites both consideration of diverse normative criteria
 and substantial discretion).
 90. Macroeconomists argue that it is important that inefficient firms disappear so
 that more efficient firms take their place. For example, Professors Ricardo J. Caballero,
 Takeo Hoshi, and Anil K. Kashyap argue that loans from Japanese banks to firms that
 would have been insolvent absent these loans prolonged the Japanese stagnation that be-
 gan in the early 1990s. Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Zombie
 Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 1943, 1944 (2008).
 This option does not include long-term subsidies - or indeed, any subsidies at all. After
 restructuring, the firm will have to remain solvent to avoid going into bankruptcy again.
 91. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that managers are incentivized
 to file Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy) .
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 reorganization value is less than the liquidation value.92 Creditors who
 believe that the firm is worth more liquidated than reorganized then file
 a § 1112(b) motion, allowing bankruptcy judges an opportunity to pre-
 serve firms and employment. Without this structural bias, bankruptcy
 judges would have fewer opportunities to preserve firms in which liquida-
 tion value is greater than reorganization value.
 Section 105 vests judges with additional discretionary authority to
 implement counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules.93 This section, on the
 "Power of Court," appears to give bankruptcy judges extraordinary
 power. Section 105(a) reads, in its entirety:
 The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
 necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
 No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by
 a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court
 from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determina-
 tion necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court or-
 ders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.94
 On its face, this provision gives judges broad discretion, though the
 provision is still delimited by the Bankruptcy Code and used sparingly.95
 Overall, given the text of the statute, its legislative history, and Supreme
 Court rulings,96 it seems likely that judges have discretion to implement
 counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules.
 In light of these provisions, this Article's proposal actually constrains
 judicial discretion rather than expands it. Bankruptcy judges already con-
 sider the effects of employment when deciding petitions under § 1112.97
 92. See, e.g., Jackson & Skeel, supra note 7, at 25. The conversion of Chapter 7 to
 Chapter 11, covered by § 706, is unlikely to be a very important lever, since few potential
 candidates for counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules are likely to file under Chapter 7.
 93. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
 94. Id. § 105(a).
 95. For example, in In re Kmart Corp., Judge Easterbrook noted that § 105 provides
 the power to "implement rather than override," so judges' actions must advance provisions
 of the statute and cannot contradict the code. 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004).
 96. See Baker Botts v. ASARCO, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169-70 (2015) (stating that bank-
 ruptcy courts have "broad discretion to decide what constitutes 'reasonable compensa-
 tion'"); Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014) ("A bankruptcy court has statutory
 authority to 'issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
 out the provisions of' the Bankruptcy Code ... it may also possess 'inherent power ... to
 sanction "abusive litigation practices.'"" (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); Marrama v. Citizens
 Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375-76 (2007))); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462
 U.S. 198, 204 (1983) (noting the broad scope of the bankruptcy estate).
 97. See, e.g., In re 1701 Commerce, LLC, 477 B.R. 652, 659 n.23 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
 2012) (ordering the continuation of a bankruptcy stay to protect the public interest, based
 in part on judicial notice of the importance of the estate to local economic development);
 see also In re Surgical Assoes., Inc., No. 13-10081-R, 2013 WL 1176233, at *6 (Bankr. N.D.
 Okla. Mar. 21, 2013) (denying a § 1112 motion partly because a potential dissolution of
 the debtor would "jeopardiz[e] . . . the economic futures of 39 employees" and again not
 mentioning the state of the economy) .
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 They invoke the goals of job preservation and value to creditors, which
 may conflict, but do so in a way that does not rigorously consider the
 value of a saved job.98 This Article offers a systematic way for bankruptcy
 judges to address this trade-off. It recommends procedures through
 which judges would consider whether the bankruptcy takes place during
 a time of high unemployment and suggests a method for measurement.
 A systematic approach would cabin the discretion bankruptcy judges cur-
 rently have to consider employment.
 Finally, implementing counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules through
 § 1112(b) need not dramatically complicate bankruptcy trials. Under
 § 1112(b), experts for creditors and management already present infor-
 mation on the valuation of the firm and the likelihood of rehabilitation.99
 Implementing counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules only calls for a few addi-
 tional pieces of information that a judge could input into a standard for-
 mula: the number of employees working at the firm, the state of the na-
 tional and local economy, the timing in the business cycle, and the types
 of workers.100 The analysis admittedly involves some parameters that are
 difficult to measure exactly, but the educated guesswork involved need
 not greatly complicate the proceedings. Management's experts (who will
 tend to favor reorganization) and creditors' experts (who will tend to
 favor liquidation) can add this small amount of information to their
 existing testimony.101
 B. Other Means of Implementing Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law Under
 Current Statute
 Section 1112(b) is just one part of the bankruptcy code that judges
 can use to implement counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules. In practice, after
 a bankruptcy survives a § 1112(b) motion - and even before - there are
 98. See, e.g., 1701 Commerce, 477 B.R. at 658-59; see also Surgical Assoes., 2013 WL
 1176233, at *6.
 99. Robert F. Reilly, Valuation Analyst Guidelines Related to Bankruptcy Expert
 Reports and Testimony, 29 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 60, 60 (2010).
 100. See supra section II. C (explaining the factors useful for deciding whether a given
 firm is worth preserving); infra Table 1 and accompanying text (applying these factors,
 along with example assumptions, to a particular context) .
 101. Another point at which a bankruptcy judge could conceivably implement coun-
 ter-cyclical bankruptcy rules is under § 1129, which determines when a judge shall confirm
 a bankruptcy reorganization plan. Before confirmation, a judge could demand that a plan
 involve fewer layoffs, for example. The judge's statutory authority to demand such a
 change, however, is quite limited. Under § 1129(a) (11), a plan must be feasible; the sec-
 tion requires that "[confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or
 the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor
 under the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11). It seems difficult to argue then that a judge
 could demand more employment in the name of feasibility when such increases in
 employment are, if anything, likely to reduce the feasibility of the plan. When choosing
 between two plans that satisfy the conditions of § 1129, however, the judge could consider
 employment implications.
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 many opportunities in which bankruptcy judges can and do promote
 reorganization. At virtually each stage of the bankruptcy proceeding,
 judges exercise discretion in ways that make reorganization more or less
 likely. These decisions will affect the value of the reorganized firm, at the
 expense of various other parties whose ex ante incentives are distorted by
 the knowledge that they may face cancellation of their contractual rights
 in the bankruptcy proceedings.
 Take the recent example of the bankruptcy of Patriot Coal, a mining
 company operating in a high-unemployment industry (coal mining), in a
 high-unemployment time (early 2013), in a high-unemployment place
 (Appalachia).102 A key issue in the bankruptcy was whether Patriot Coal
 could cancel the collective bargaining agreement of its unionized
 employees, roughly a third of its total employees, under sections 1113
 and 1114 of the bankruptcy code. In deciding to grant Patriot Coal's mo-
 tion to reject its collective bargaining agreement, the bankruptcy judge
 said that among the questions affecting the court's decision was the out-
 come for "the current employees; the fate of the rank and file . . . coal
 miners."103 The court also asked, "What effect will this Court's ruling
 have on local economies, particularly those in mining communities that
 thrive on the patronage of those affected by the outcome of the
 1113/1114 Motion?"104 In answering these questions, the judge argued:
 If Debtors liquidate, the overwhelming majority of Debtors' cur-
 rent employees . . . will be unemployed. There is no question
 that even today, numerous miners remain unemployed from the
 liquidation of Debtors' former competitors, and Debtors'
 employees would add to this joblessness. If . . . Debtors liqui-
 date, state and federal governments will likely be left to remedy
 the carnage . . . ,105
 In rejecting the union's collective bargaining agreement, the firm's
 unionized employees and pensioners lost, but the firm's employees over-
 all, government finances, and the local economy won. The rejection
 transformed the company from one in which the liquidation value was
 greater than the reorganization value to the reverse, and the company
 has now successfully emerged from bankruptcy reorganized.106 Counter-
 cyclical bankruptcy rules justify such actions under the right economic
 circumstances.
 Bankruptcy judges already make many similar decisions. The court
 can effectively set a higher or lower threshold for marginal cases in decid-
 102. In re Patriot Coal Corp., 493 B.R. 65 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013).
 103. Id. at 130.
 104. Id. at 80.
 105. Id. at 137.
 106. Id. at 130 (finding that rejecting the collective bargaining agreement was neces-
 sary to avoid liquidation); Jacqueline Palank, Court Approves Patriot Coal's Bankruptcy-
 Exit Plan, Wall St. J. (Dec. 17, 2013, 12:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
 SB1 0001 424052702303949504579264270807341 770 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) .
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 ing when to lift the "automatic stay," which prevents other parties from
 exercising their contractual rights so that the debtor can have time to
 reorganize.107 When staying other parties' repossession of assets requires
 the availability of the debtor's assets to pay off the other parties and the
 court therefore prevents other parties from exercising their contractual
 rights, the court can be more or less stringent in requiring "adequate
 protection."108 The court also plays a substantial role in deciding when
 the debtor can use, sell, or lease property.109 The list of similar decisions a
 bankruptcy judge must make continues throughout much of the
 bankruptcy process. The key point is that bankruptcy judges can and do
 make decisions to help firms reorganize at the expense of other parties'
 contractual rights.
 C. Statutory Changes to Implement Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law
 An alternative to adopting counter-cyclical legal rules within the cur-
 rent bankruptcy code is to change the statute, thereby opening up a
 broad range of options. Any of the options discussed below would ad-
 dress the weakness of the proposals above that, although there are strong
 biases in favor of a reorganization plan being proposed, such a plan must
 in fact be proposed for a bankruptcy judge to have the opportunity to
 alter her rulings to favor maintaining employment at the appropriate
 times. Exploring these options fully is beyond the scope of the Article,
 but a few possibilities are worth mentioning. First, the government could
 spend money to preserve companies in the name of employment. This
 would effectively remove the distortion to creditor lending and increase
 the burden on taxpayers, although by a smaller amount than would
 result from typical government stimulus programs.110 One concern might
 be that this spending could create a moral hazard for firms or result in
 windfalls, especially if political considerations matter for decisionmakers.111
 107. 11 U.S.C. §362 (2012).
 108. Id. §§ 361-364.
 109. Id. § 363.
 110. This result flows naturally from the analysis in the Article. In the same way that
 the loss to creditors is less than the amount that the government would have to pay
 through conventional programs to sustain employment, the government could pay the
 creditors to preserve the firm for an amount less than it would conventionally spend.
 These are precisely the cases the analysis above attempted to distinguish from cases in
 which maintaining employment is not worth it.
 111. "Moral hazard" is the name for the response of actors to knowledge that they will
 be compensated if something bad happens to them. Actors engaging in moral hazard
 choose to adopt more of a behavior that could lead to the bad outcome - for example, a
 driver engaging in moral hazard drives more dangerously if she knows that car insurance
 will pay to fix the car if an accident occurs. See, e.g., Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of
 Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 238-39 (1996) (defining the concept of moral hazard
 and investigating its genealogy). In this Article's case, firms might make more risky bets
 with the knowledge that they could get government financing if they fail.
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 A second possibility is to give the government priority in voting for
 bankruptcy reorganization plans in order to lend additional support to
 plans when it would be efficient to preserve jobs but creditors may not
 opt to do so.112 The government could become a pseudo-creditor in
 bankruptcy proceedings. Or the government's right could be limited to
 proposing a reorganization plan. However, while giving the government
 a voice would allow it to encourage the reorganization of the firm, add-
 ing another voice could complicate already very litigious proceedings
 and invite some of the same problems arising from the proposal to use
 government expenditure to preserve companies. A third possibility is to
 give the employees themselves the opportunity to propose a reorganiza-
 tion plan or priority in voting for a bankruptcy plan commensurate with
 the job-preserving benefits. This possibility could follow other proposals
 for giving employees a vote in order to promote efficient bankruptcy on
 other grounds.113 However, such an approach may create the same issues
 that would arise if the government were awarded a priority vote in these
 proceedings.114
 IV. Example Application
 To illustrate how this methodology of taking into account macroeco-
 nomic context in bankruptcy proceedings would work, consider two cases
 in which judges exhibited an explicit goal of promoting reorganization.
 Both cases were filed in the first half of 2013, when unemployment was
 still elevated in the United States but with variations among industries
 and locations.115 In one case, the efficiency considerations that underlie
 counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules support the outcome; in the other, they
 do not. First, in the Patrìot Coal case described in section III.B above, the
 112. Another possible statutory change would be to explicitly introduce public-interest
 considerations into a judge's decision to approve a plan, as is the case for antitrust settle-
 ments under the Tunney Act. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).
 113. In particular, Professor Anthony J. Casey has suggested that the "option-preserv-
 ing" priority given junior creditors like employees maximizes efficiency in the face of the
 incentives that drive senior creditors to maximize their own gain at the expense of junior
 creditors. See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority
 in Chapter 11, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 792-96 (2011) (discussing the option-preservation
 priority mechanism); see also Donald S. Bernstein & James E. Millstein, ABI Commission:
 Redemption Option Value Explained, 34 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 10, 11, 57 (2015) (discussing
 the implementation of such a proposal).
 114. In addition to playing a role in reorganization, the government or employees
 could play a role in § 363 asset sales.
 115. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation - June 2013,
 at 1, tbl.A-14 (July 5, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_
 07052013.pdf [http://perma.cc/URK3-2FZW] (noting "the unemployment rate [for
 June] was unchanged at 7.6 percent"); Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Regional
 and State Employment and Unemployment- June 2013, at 1-2 (2013), http://
 www.bls.gov/news.release/ archives/laus_07182013.pdf [http://perma.cc/8HCS-V59Z]
 (reporting regional and state variation in unemployment rates).
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 court considered the effects of "highly likely loss of jobs of those who
 need them most - the rank and file [workers]"116 and made decisions
 that promoted reorganization. The judge found that the reorganization
 saved the "overwhelming majority" of Patriot Coal's 4,200 employees
 from unemployment and noted the very high unemployment rate for
 miners in Appalachia, where Patriot Coal mined.117 With such a large
 number of workers facing such a difficult macroeconomic environment,
 the liquidation value of the firm would have to be substantially higher
 than the reorganization value for liquidation to be efficient.118
 Next, consider the bankruptcy of Surgical Associates, Inc., an
 Oklahoma surgical practice.119 In that case, the bankruptcy judge refused
 to grant a § 1112 motion to dismiss, partly out of concern for "jeopardiz-
 ing . . . the economic futures of [the company's] 39 employees."120
 However, the unemployment rate in the health care sector was low,121
 and surgeons faced almost no unemployment.122 Additionally, Oklahoma
 had a low unemployment rate of five percent in February 2013, when the
 motion to dismiss was filed.123 Given that these workers faced very strong
 job-market prospects, reorganizing the firm in the name of employment
 was inefficient, harming creditors and benefitting workers little. With
 these facts, even if the liquidation value was only a small amount greater
 than the reorganization value, liquidation would still be the appropriate
 remedy.
 Applying this methodology to a specific hypothetical case demon-
 strates its value in allowing a judge to quantitatively distinguish whether
 considering employment effects is appropriate, as in the Patńot Coal case,
 116. In re Patriot Coal Corp., 493 B.R. 65, 138 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013).
 117. Id. at 90, 137 (noting that eleven of Patriot Coal's mining complexes were in the
 Appalachia region).
 118. Although the case materials do not give specific values, it must be that the
 liquidation and reorganization values were similar, since just the value of the collective
 bargaining agreement was enough to shift Patriot Coal from a firm with liquidation value
 greater than reorganization value to the reverse.
 119. In re Suigical Assoes., Inc., No. 13-10081-R, 2013 WL 1176233 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Mar.
 21,2013).
 120. Id. at *6.
 121. The unemployment rate in the education and health services sector in April 2013
 was 4.4%. Unemployment Rate - Education and Health Services, Private Wage and Salary
 Workers, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04032240?
 data_tool=XGtable [http://perma.cc/Q6X6-PX7C] (last visited July 29, 2016).
 122. The unemployment rate for surgeons and physicians in 2012 was 0.8%. John F.
 Sargent, Jr., Cong. Research Serv., R43061, The U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce:
 Recent, Current, and Projected Employment, Wages, and Unemployment 9 (2014),
 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43061 .pdf [http://perma.cc/C5CN-BL3V] .
 123. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Regional and State Employment and
 Unemployment (Monthly) News Release (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/
 news.release/archives/laus_032920 13.htm [http://perma.cc/6AXS-T4TQ].
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 or inappropriate, as in the Surgical Associates case.124 Suppose that a judge
 sought to adopt the view advocated in this Article and applied it through
 § 1112(b).125 This section offers a hypothetical analysis of this methodol-
 ogy using an editable program that takes into account various factors,
 which are listed in Table 1 along with the assumptions, data, and sources
 used. Definitively developing such a calculation is beyond the scope of
 the Article, but an example illustrates the implementation of counter-
 cyclical bankruptcy rules.
 Overall, the goal is to compare the benefits with the costs of preserv-
 ing a job through bankruptcy. To calculate the benefits, one must take
 into account the economic conditions that the laid-off workers (and oth-
 ers affected by the liquidation) would face over the period that workers
 are affected by the decision to liquidate. Recall from section II.C.l that
 the value of a preserved direct job during the recession, J = almG , was
 estimated as $60,096, which depends upon the ratio of distortion
 between taxation and reducing payments to creditors a, the conversion
 between direct jobs preserved and job-years created directly Z, the
 Keynesian multiplier m, and the shadow value of a job during a recession
 G.126 The key in applying this number or one like it to a given situation is
 to make the value appropriate to the particular state of the economy.
 Thus, this section demonstrates how to vary this number depending
 upon u, which this Article defines as the unemployment rate for affected
 workers, and then applies the method to the illustrative situation that
 begins the Article.
 This benefit of a job preserved then needs to be compared to the
 L-R
 cost of a job preserved through bankruptcy, As described in section
 II.C.l, the numerator of the formula is the difference between liquida-
 tion value (L) and reorganization value ( R ), and the denominator is the
 number of jobs directly preserved by reorganizing rather than liquidat-
 ing the firm (D).
 Figure 1 shows this comparison between the benefit and cost of pre-
 serving a job. If the reorganization value is greater than the liquidation
 value (i.e., the cost of a job saved is negative), the firm should definitely
 be reorganized. At the other extreme, if the cost of a job saved is greater
 124. Compare In re Patriot Coal Corp., 493 B.R. 65, 137 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013) (not-
 ing that if the debtors liquidate, the majority of their employees will lose their jobs), with
 In re Surgical Assoes ., 2013 WL 1176233 at *6 (denying a motion to dismiss partly because
 the debtor's dissolution would "jeapordiz[e] the . . . economic futures of 39 employees").
 125. See supra section III.A for how § 1112(b) could be used. A similar analysis could
 be done using other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, as explained in section III.B, or
 through changing the law, as explained in section III.C.
 126. A more complicated model might take into account the value of preserving jobs
 as the unemployment rate changes over time following a bankruptcy and the full distribu-
 tion of the duration of averted unemployment, but this analysis does not consider those
 factors. Also, for simplicity, this Article ignores discounting, which is likely not a significant
 factor over the time ranges considered here.
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 than /, the firm should definitely not be reorganized. In the middle,
 though, when the cost of a job saved is between 0 and /, counter-cyclical
 bankruptcy rules make a difference.
 Figure 1 : Optimal Reorganization as a Function of Cost of
 Preserving a Job
 ^ 4. L~R ^ Cost 4. = -
 D
 M
eorganize q Reorganize only under j Do not
 counter-cyclical rules reorganize
 Turning to measuring the benefit of preserving a job J, the analysis
 depends upon measuring the unemployment rate for affected workers.
 To measure this rate, one must make several choices; other decisions
 would also be reasonable. In the calculations presented here, four factors
 affect u : the national average unemployment rate, the unemployment
 rate of the state in which the firm's workers are employed, the unemploy-
 ment rate of individuals with characteristics (in this case, educational at-
 tainment) typical of the firm's workers, and the expected future
 unemployment rate.
 The unemployment rate must then be translated into the value of a
 preserved job. To calculate / as a function of u over this time period, the
 $60,096 value per job for the most recent recession is pegged to an
 unemployment rate of 9.45%, which was the average unemployment rate
 of 2009-2010.127 This value per job is then phased out to zero dollars as
 the unemployment rate drops to the "natural rate of unemployment."128
 For the natural rate of unemployment, the estimate of 6.20% by
 Professors Douglas Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark Watson is used.129
 At this unemployment rate, the value of a job saved is zero.
 127. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor
 Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [http://perma.cc/3469-YKXY]
 (last visited July 29, 2016).
 128. In particular, this value is linearly scaled out as the unemployment rate for af-
 fected workers drops from the unemployment rate during the recession of 9.45% to the
 natural rate of unemployment.
 129. Douglas Staiger, James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, How Precise Are Estimates of
 the Natural Rate of Unemployment, in Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy 195,
 199 (Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer eds., 1997), http://www.nber.org/chapters/
 c8885.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8B5-3KRE] (providing a standard citation on the natural
 rate); see also Thomas B. King & James Morley, In Search of the Natural Rate of
 Unemployment, 54 J. Monetary Econ. 550, 556 (2007) (providing a more recent estimate).
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 To apply this framework, suppose Acme Corp. is located in
 Michigan, typically employs high-school graduates with no college
 education, and went bankrupt in February 2009. In March 2009, a judge
 is deciding whether to liquidate or reorganize the firm in a § 1112(b)
 motion. First, the judge would need to calculate the value of a job saved
 /, which depends upon the unemployment rate for affected workers u.
 The information with which to calculate u is available from two sources.
 These data, along with the relevant assumptions and sources, are listed in
 Table 1. From the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a bankruptcy judge would
 know that the national unemployment rate in February 2009 was 8. 3%, 130
 the unemployment rate in Michigan was 12.0%, 131 and the
 unemployment rate of high-school graduates with no college education
 was 8.5%. 132 To estimate the "effective current unemployment rate" ( E in
 Table 1), these three numbers are averaged to 9.6%. The expected future
 unemployment rate over the duration was between the 8.65% expected
 rate in 2009 and the 8.15% expected rate the following year in 2010,
 according to the Federal Reserve.133 For this analysis, the expected future
 rate of unemployment ( F in Table 1) is the average of these two figures.
 Averaging the current unemployment rate and the expected future
 unemployment rate yields an unemployment rate of affected workers ( u )
 of 9.00%.
 Note that there is evidence that the natural rate varies with time, which this analysis
 ignores.
 130. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Labor Force Statistics, supra note 77. The
 historical and present national unemployment rates are available at the Bureau of Labor
 Statistics 's website. Id. Note that the Bureau of Labor Statistics only provides estimates to
 the tenths, not the hundredths, of a percentage point. Id.
 131. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Regional and State Employment and
 Unemployment (Monthly) News Releases (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.bls.gov/
 news.release/archives/laus_03272009.htm [http://perma.cc/2BY9-26EE].
 132. Data Retrieval: Labor Force Statistics (CPS), Bureau of Labor Statisdcs,
 http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab4.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
 (last visited Sept. 26, 2016) (follow "Table A-4. Employment status of the civilian
 population 25 years and over by educational attainment" hyperlink; then select all under
 "Not Seasonally Adjusted" and "Seasonally Adjusted"; then select "Retrieve Data").
 133. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Minutes of the Federal Open Market
 Committee on January 27-28, 2009, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
 fomcminutes20090128ep.htm [http://perma.cc/56FJ-ZRSH] .
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 Table 1 : Sample Calculation for Bankrupt Firm in February 2009
 Variable
 Baseline Value per job Preserved
 Ratio of distortion from tax on taxpayers 0.25 Ballard et al. and
 versus creditors (a) assumptions
 Average unemployment duration of displaced 0.96 Färber
 worker (in years) (I)
 Keynesian multiplier (m) 2 Chodorow-Reich et al.
 Value of ajob-year ( G ) $125,000 White House Council of
 Economic Advisers
 Baseline value per job preserved (ß) $60, 096 Multiply the 4 previous values
 Effective Current Unemployment Rate
 Current national unemployment rate 8.3% Bureau of Labor Statistics
 Current local (Michigan) unemployment rate 12.0% Bureau of Labor Statistics
 Current unemployment rate for typical 8.5% Bureau of Labor Statistics
 worker (high-school graduates with no
 Effective current unemployment rate (F) 9. 6% Average the 3 previous values
 Forecasted Unemployment Rate
 Forecasted unemployment rate in current 8.65% Federal Reserve
 year
 Forecasted unemployment rate in next year
 Forecasted unemployment rate (F) 8. 40% Average the 2 previous values
 Scaledown Factor for Value per Job Preserved
 Unemployment rate associated with baseline 9.45% Unemployment rate during
 value ( T ) Great Recession
 Unemployment rate for affected workers (u) 9.00% Average current (F) and
 forecasted
 (F) unemployment
 Natural rate of unemployment (fV)
 Scaledown factor for value per job preserved 86.15% Formula' (u- N) /(T - N)
 m
 Value of a job preserved in February 2009 (J) $51,775 Multiply baseline (ß) by
 The assumptions of section II.C.l of a Keynesian multiplier m of 2, a
 ratio of the distortion from increasing tax  to the disto tion rom reduc-
 ing payments to creditors a of 0.25, 134 and a c nversion of direct employ-
ment into preserved job-years of 0.96 (or 50/52) yield an estimated value
 per job during the recession of $60,096 ( B in Table l).135 An unem-
loyment rate for aff ted workers of .00% yields a scaledown factor ( H
 134. The calculations assume that the distortion from the government raising the
 revenue to save a job is equal to the distor ion from "taxing" creditors to s ve a job- that
is, the ra io of the distortion from the "creditor tax" to the MCPF is one. The calculations
 also assume that a dollar f government spending produces something worth  dollar,
while the difference between liquidation valu  and reo ganization value is pure waste.
 135. See supra note 59 and accompanyi g text.
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 in Table 1) of 86.15% by which to multiply the baseline value per job
 preserved ( B in Table 1) of $60,096, which is associated with a 9.45% un-
 employment rate. Multiplying the baseline value per job preserved by the
 scaledown factor yields a / of $51, 775. 136
 When considering whether to convert Acme Corp.'s bankruptcy
 proceedings into a Chapter 7, the judge should then compare this bene-
 fit of preserving jobs to the costs of preserving a job, as calculated by es-
 timating the liquidation value (L), reorganization value (/?), and the
 number of workers that Acme Corp. employs. For this calculation, return
 to the figures in this Article's initial example. Suppose that the liquida-
 tion value of Acme Corp. is $1,500,000, the reorganization value is
 $1,000,000, and the number of jobs preserved is 1,000. The cost of a job
 saved is therefore $500, which is far less than the value of a job saved of
 $51,775. This firm should be reorganized, producing $51,775,000 of
 value and avoiding the distortion resulting from $125,000,000 in gov-
 ernment expenditures at a cost of $500,000 to creditors. Different as-
 sumptions would yield different numbers, but this example illustrates
 how the benefits of preserving a firm can greatly exceed the costs of
 doing so.
 V. Responding to Potential Critiques
 A. Institutional Competency of the Bankruptcy System
 Though, as described earlier, counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules need
 not be implemented through the current bankruptcy system,137 a natural
 critique of implementing them through the current system is that bank-
 ruptcy judges lack the necessary competence. For example, Professor
 Schwartz notes "[a] s an example of bankruptcy's comparative
 disadvantage, bankruptcy courts do not have access to local labor market
 information, but state unemployment offices do," thereby making the
 latter a superior institution for reducing unemployment.138 There are
 several responses to this argument.
 First, bankruptcy judges already exercise a tremendous amount of
 discretion and take employment effects into account.139 Bankruptcy
 136. Another parameter that could be changed in the calculation is how this number
 is scaled down. Here, the figure was scaled down linearly, but it could be scaled down more
 quickly or slowly. Or an entirely different method of calculating it could be used.
 137. See supra section III.C.
 138. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J.
 1807, 1819 (1998).
 139. See Nicola Gennaioli & Stefano Rossi, Judicial Discretion in Corporate
 Bankruptcy, 23 Rev. Fin. Stud. 4078, 4078 n.l (2010) ("For example, U.S. Chapter 11
 leaves bankruptcy courts discretion on issues such as first-day orders, refinancing, exten-
 sions of exclusivity, appointments of trustees, and the final approval of a reorganization
 plan."); Stuart C. Gilson, Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose
 Between Workouts and Chapter 11, 4 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 62, 64-65 (1991) ("[T]he
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 judges sit in equity. By § 105, they explicitly have tremendous power to
 implement the goals of the bankruptcy code,140 which - legislative history
 suggests - includes preserving employment.141
 More importantly, observers already believe that bankruptcy judges
 exercise their discretion in a way that favors the continuation of the
 firm.142 Hence, the counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules do not require
 judges to exercise any discretion that they do not already exercise but
 instead only to exercise it more effectively; such rules require that judges
 put a thumb on the scale in favor of reorganization in times of high
 unemployment and that they refrain from doing so in times of low unem-
 ployment. The crucial data on unemployment rates are readily availa-
 ble,143 and I suggest a method of applying the data so that the proposal
 actually constrains judicial discretion.
 Finally, even conceding that it might be undesirable for bankruptcy
 judges to have the additional burden of judging the state of the macroe-
 conomy, the right question is not whether bankruptcy judges are good
 decisionmakers for this purpose. Rather, the question is whether they are
 the best available decisionmakers in this arena. It might be better to have
 an omniscient and benevolent social planner decide which firms must
 stay in existence via reorganization, but no such institution exists. We are
 left with the institutions we have - and, therefore, if taxpayers are to save
 a substantial amount of money at relatively little expense to creditors and
 no statutory changes are made, then bankruptcy judges ought to be the
 ones to implement counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules. Indeed, the desire
 to keep bankruptcy law and job-creating government programs simple is
 Bankruptcy Code effectively requires judges to set corporate operating policies . . . [mean-
 ing] judges have broad powers to influence how the firm's assets are managed."); Harvey
 R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as
 Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 Am. Bankr.
 L.J. 431, 433 (1995) ("In contrast to the debtor-in-possession, the role of the bankruptcy
 judge has come almost full circle to be equivalent to the role played by the judge under
 the Bankruptcy Act, augmented by the power to take numerous actions sua sponte.").
 140. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
 141. See supra note 11.
 142. See Gennaioli 8c Rossi, supra note 139, at 4078-80 (presenting a model that sug-
 gests judicial discretion plays a substantial role in creating "systematic pro-debtor bias in
 the bankruptcy code"); Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the
 Bankruptcy Courts, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 747, 777-78 ("On bankruptcy-specific questions, bank-
 ruptcy judges enjoy significant discretion."); Morrison, supra note 14, at 392-93
 ("Traditional accounts of Chapter 11 . . . argue that the bankruptcy process is biased in
 favor of preserving businesses that are economically distressed and should be liquidated
 immediately."); see also supra note 97 (providing decisions applying § 1112(b) that
 consider employment effects). Finally, for Supreme Court cases suggesting that
 bankruptcy should favor continuation of the firm, see supra note 11.
 143. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text (describing availability and nature
 of unemployment data) .
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 appropriate - but it may be worth some sacrifice in simplicity to pursue
 other worthwhile goals.144
 B. Asymmetry with Law Outside of Bankruptcy
 Another potential critique of this Article's proposal is that outside of
 bankruptcy, firms can liquidate as much as they please, regardless of
 bankruptcy law's attempts to preserve firms intact if they enter bank-
 ruptcy. This proposal would then yield an asymmetry between counter-
 cyclical rules within bankruptcy and the absence of such rules outside of
 bankruptcy, causing different treatment for similar firms inside and out-
 side of bankruptcy. Such an asymmetry could deter use of the bankruptcy
 system, with its associated orderly procedures, and instead encourage
 settlement of affairs outside of the bankruptcy system. There are two re-
 sponses to this critique.
 First, the scope of the asymmetry may be rather limited, since firms
 that would ideally be affected by counter-cyclical rules are likely to enter
 the bankruptcy system; therefore, few firms that would have been realistic
 candidates for reorganization under counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules
 will liquidate outside of bankruptcy. The reason for the limited scope of
 the asymmetry is that counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules are likely to affect
 a firm with similar reorganization and liquidation values - a firm that, in
 other words, is a close candidate for being reorganized. This class of
 firms is likely to enter bankruptcy because those making the decision to
 enter the system have a preference for reorganization, so that they can
 keep their jobs145 and reorganization is easier within the bankruptcy sys-
 tem. Indeed, the automatic stay and other hallmark features of bank-
 ruptcy are designed to solve the collective action problem that arises
 when creditors pick apart a potentially viable firm.146 In other words, the
 combination of the advantages of bankruptcy for reorganizations and the
 pro-reorganization bias of management likely means that, in practice,
 counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules would produce little asymmetry inside
 and outside of bankruptcy, since few firms outside of bankruptcy would
 have been reorganized on the basis of such rules had they entered
 bankruptcy.
 144. For additional arguments in the debate over judicial competence in the context
 of bankruptcy, see Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L.J. 573,
 585-86 (1998) (describing the "proceduralist" argument in support of a limited role for
 judges); Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and
 Statutory Design, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 593-96 (2001) (supporting a more expansive role
 forjudges) .
 145. See Jackson 8c Skeel, supra note 7, at 24-25 (noting that firms and their employ-
 ees have incentives to prefer reorganization over liquidation).
 146. See Thomas H. Jackson 8c Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
 Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 160 (1989)
 (noting that resolving such collective action problems is a "principal justification" for
 bankruptcy law) .
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 Second, as with the issue of institutional competence, the ideal tool
 for solving this problem may not exist. All else equal, having similar poli-
 cies inside and outside of bankruptcy may be ideal. But if that is not an
 option while having counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules, then it may be
 best to have different treatments inside and outside of bankruptcy. Some
 inefficiency could arise from a small number of firms being discouraged
 from entering bankruptcy due to counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules - and
 that efficiency should be taken into account in the rules. But the fact that
 it would be too onerous to implement similar policies outside of bank-
 ruptcy because the government lacks tools to do so does not mean that it
 is undesirable to include such rules within bankruptcy law.
 C. Alternative Policies Would Be Superior
 It may be more efficient for bankruptcy law to preserve employment
 during recessions than to have laid-off employees rely upon the welfare
 state and government stimulus programs given their attendant costs to
 the taxpayer. This is not a sufficient argument for implementing counter-
 cyclical bankruptcy rules if there is another option that would be supe-
 rior to either such bankruptcy rules or existing government programs.
 For example, some have argued that job-training programs would be
 more effective in helping those unemployed due to bankruptcies.147
 However, job training does not help those who cannot find jobs. Indeed,
 empirical evidence suggests the limited effectiveness of such policies over
 the time horizon relevant for sustaining employment during a reces-
 sion.148 Others have suggested that unemployment offices can help the
 unemployed find jobs. However, this assistance appears to be of litde
 help. Interviews with unemployment counselors suggest that, even with a
 lot of effort, it can be difficult to find a job during a recession; there
 simply are not enough jobs to go around, and more help on the job
 market will not change that.149
 The existence of a policy that would be more efficient than counter-
 cyclical bankruptcy rules at reducing costs to the government from
 unemployment cannot be ruled out. However, it is unclear where the
 silver bullet would come from. Congress's effort to reduce unemploy-
 ment during the Great Recession was certainly not perfect, but it repre-
 sents a good guess of the policies that can be used to reduce
 unemployment during recessions- and the program was very expen-
 147. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
 96 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 53-54 (1997) (suggesting that no scholar has shown that reorganiza-
 tion more effectively mitigates social harm than the welfare state) .
 148. See David Card, Jochen Kluve & Andrea Weber, Active Labour Market Policy
 Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis, 120 Econ. J. F452, F453 (2010) ("Classroom and on-the-job
 training programmes are not particularly effective in the short run, but have more positive
 relative impacts after two years.").
 149. See Truman F. Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession 341-43 (1999).
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 sive.150 Congress simply did not find cheap ways of sustaining employ-
 ment. And this "good guess" is the very set of programs used in this
 Article as a measure of costs. The key point is that such programs impose
 a cost on taxpayers, and in some cases, that burden can be reduced sub-
 stantially through bankruptcy law at relatively little cost to creditors.
 D. Re-Entry into Bankruptcy
 Fourth, one might be concerned that firms with a greater liquida-
 tion value than reorganization value are likely to fall back into bank-
 ruptcy. Indeed, these so-called "Chapter 22s" (because of the second
 Chapter 11 filing) are quite common, perhaps partly due to the existing
 "pro-reorganization" bias in bankruptcy law.151 However, from the
 perspective developed in this Article, re-entry into bankruptcy after reor-
 ganization is not necessarily a bad thing. Even if the factory eventually
 liquidates, delaying the time at which its workers enroll in Medicaid and
 other government programs is valuable, especially if the original bank-
 ruptcy proceedings occurred at the trough of a recession. In addition,
 some reappearances make sense even in good times. Whether or not a
 firm will succeed is usually uncertain, so many firms that have a positive
 expected value will file again. But, during recessions, even more of those
 firms should stay around - and then refile later, during better economic
 times, because of their positive employment effects in the short run.152
 E. Few Bankruptcies Take Place During Times of High Unemployment
 A final potential critique is that few bankruptcies take place during
 times of high unemployment. It is true that the unemployment rate is
 often low. However, as Figure 2 shows, bankruptcy filings are strongly
 counter-cyclical; there are many more when the unemployment rate is
 high.153 As a result, the fraction of bankruptcies that occur when the
 150. See Alan S. Blinder & Marie Zandi, How the Great Recession Was Brought to an End 3
 (2010) , http://www.economy.com/maik-zandi/documents/End-of-Great-Recession.pdf [http:/ /
 perma.cc/8Y7G-SP2U] (tabulating congressional expenditures in response to the Great
 Recession).
 151. See Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy-Reorganization
 Process, 1993 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 6; Edward I. Altman et al., Post-Chapter 11
 Bankruptcy Performance: Avoiding Chapter 22, 21 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 53, 53-54 (2009).
 152. A related concern might be the § 1129 requirement that, for ajudge to approve a
 plan of reorganization, the judge must find that "the plan is not likely to be followed by
 the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11)
 (2012). However, as described in section III.B, after the variety of steps that judges take in
 the name of promoting reorganization, firms affected by counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules
 are likely to exit in a relatively strong position and will likely not face liquidation upon
 exit.
 153. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Databases, Tables 8c
 Calculators by Subject, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
 LNU04000000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (select "1980" in "From" date field;
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 economy is in a recession is higher than the fraction of time that the
 economy is in a recession. Also, even if only a small fraction of bankrupt-
 cies are affected, the stakes are large, as the Chrysler example showed.154
 Preserving jobs through bankruptcy during recessions has the potential
 to save the government considerable resources and substantially increase
 efficiency.
 Figure 2: Business Bankruptcy Filings and Unemployment Rate
 Conclusion
 This Article argues that an efficient bankruptcy law should seek to
 preserve employment during recessions. Preserving jobs when the unem-
 ployment rate is high reduces the need for government expenditures on
 social-insurance payments and leads to Keynesian multipliers, which in-
 crease overall employment and efficiency in the economy. Without any
 change in the law, judges could implement such a counter-cyclical rule
 using § 1112(b) and other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Or Congress
 could enact statutory changes to permit government expenditures on
 reorganizations or grant the government quasi-creditor status in bank-
 ruptcy proceedings. This Article has also discussed relevant factors like
 the local and forecasted unemployment rates and shown that data are
 readily available to help consider these factors. This Article does not ar-
 gue that, on average, bankruptcy law should be any more employment-
 preserving than it is now or that judges should have more discretion. Ra-
 then select "2012" in "To" date field; then select "Go" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 27,
 2016).
 154. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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 ther, this Article argues that, during times of high unemployment, judges
 or other policymakers should use the method proposed herein to sustain
 employment in some cases. These counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules con-
 strain judicial discretion in the interest of greater efficiency. Outside of
 recessions, this Article supports the traditional law and economics argu-
 ment that bankruptcy law should maximize the return to creditors.
 More broadly, the Article suggests a framework for thinking about
 macroeconomic considerations in the law. The methodology for measur-
 ing the shadow value of a job saved could be applied to other areas of the
 law. For example, the goal of preserving jobs more cost-effectively during
 times of high unemployment could inform cost-benefit analysis of regula-
 tions. Such policies would increase efficiency, help encourage economic
 recovery, and maintain employment for workers desperately in need of
 jobs.
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